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Abstract
This note shows that permanent fluctuations in the Cobweb model—
though inconsistent with a rational expectations equilibrium—can be
justified as being rational when reinterpreting the model in the theory
of rational beliefs.
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1. Introduction. The Cobweb model of output and price fluctuations at-
tempts to explain business cycles within a simple dynamic supply–demand
model. When supply adjustment is slow (as e.g. in agriculture) and suppliers
base their production decision on the last observed price, cycles of fixed or
growing amplitude can occur, see e.g. Ezekiel (1938). Static as well as adap-
tive expectations (Nerlove, 1958) however are aﬄicted with non-vanishing
forecasting errors in the presence of persistent periodic fluctuations. The
costs associated with repeated and systematic mistakes in forecasting prices
makes both models of expectation formation implausible as a model of ratio-
nal behavior because the firm has an incentive to gather information on the
market structure. In fact, a simple diagram depicting supply versus market-
clearing price for past periods suffices to obtain the required information.
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The rational expectations paradigm, Muth (1961), rules out any cyclical fluc-
tuations in the Cobweb model on the basis of these considerations: Under
rational expectations perceived and actual distribution of prices have to co-
incide, which is only possible in a steady state of the Cobweb model. One has
to point out that strong assumptions underlie this reasoning. For instance,
what convinces an agent to believe that the distribution of past prices have
been used to determine the supply in every past period? The decision-maker
in the firm has to have access to a complete record of historically perceived
distribution of prices in order to decide that matter. Observed data how-
ever can be interpreted in many different ways and thus may support or
“rationalize” many different supply decisions.
In the theory of rational beliefs, Kurz (1994,1997), rationality of agents
is judged by the compatibility of their forecast with past data. In short, a
rational belief is a subjective probability distribution that is compatible with
the data in the sense that the empirical measures coincide. In the Cobweb
model this means the probability of events under the agent’s perceived (pos-
sibly non-stationary) and the actual distribution of the price—both averaged
over time—have to be identical. We show that permanent (and in particu-
lar cyclic) price fluctuations can be reconciled with rational decisions in the
Cobweb model even if they are not compatible with a rational expectations
equilibrium.
2. Model. Assume there is one firm with cost function C(q) that has to
decide on total supply before knowing the future price of the good. If the
firm acts as price-taker1, the profit maximization problem is given by
max
q
pe q − C(q) (1)
where pe is the expected price. If the forecasted price is a random variable
then pe is its expected value. Assuming a increasing, strictly concave and
continuously differentiable cost function, there is an optimal output q! =
(C ′)−1(pe). The actual market-clearing price is then determined by
p! = D−1(q!) = D−1
[
(C ′)−1(pe)
]
=: F (pe) (2)
where demand D(p) is assumed to be strictly decreasing in the price.
Under naive expectations the last observed price is taken as the forecast,
i.e. pe = p(t − 1). The dynamics of the price is then determined by the law
of motion F :
p(t) = F (p(t− 1)) (3)
1An assumption made for simplicity of presentation only; one can also analyze a mo-
nopolistic firm.
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Depending on the functional form of the law of motion F , the price dynamics
can be governed by stable or unstable fixed points, cycles of any period, or
chaotic dynamics, see e.g. Devaney (1989). Attention is restricted here to
the case in which F permits a periodic solution of period n > 1 and a steady
state.
3. Results. Suppose the law of motion F has a cycle of period n ≥ 2 with
values p1, ..., pn (i.e. F (pi) = pi+1 for i = 1, ..., n−1, and F (pn) = p1), as well
as a fixed point p0 (i.e. F (p0) = p0). A firm forecasting at the first time of
production the price p(0) = p1 makes the output decision q1 = (C ′)−1(p1).
This implies a market-clearing price p(1) = D−1(q1) = F (p1) = p2. In
the next period, q2 = (C ′)−1(p2) implies the market-clearing price p(2) =
D−1(q2) = F (p2) = p3. After n periods the cycle repeats. Analogously for
any other initial price forecast p(0) = pi. Thus naive expectations lead to
the sequence of market-clearing prices p(t) = p(i+t−1modn)+1. The forecast
fails to correctly predict the price and thus we do not observe a rational
expectations equilibrium. Since the law of motion F also possesses a fixed
point, another sequence of prices can occur under naive expectations. If the
very first forecast of the firm is based on p(0) = p0, the output decision
q0 = (C ′)−1(p0) implies the market-clearing price p(1) = D−1(q0) = F (p0) =
p0. The firm’s forecast is fulfilled. pe = p(t) and p(0) = p0 constitutes
a rational expectations equilibrium. Suppose the firm has all information
needed to compare forecast with observed price. Then cyclic dynamics lead to
an obvious pattern in forecasting errors while at the steady state forecast and
actual price are identical. However in both cases the empirical distributions
of forecast and actual price are identical. This observation is central to the
theory of rational beliefs. Let us elaborate this point in more detail.
Suppose there is an infinite history of observations and that past prices are
equal to pi, i = 1, .., n, or p0. Let the price p0 occur with relative frequency
α, and assume all prices pi, i = 1, .., n, are observed with the same frequency
β := (1 − α)/n. The empirical measure of the past prices is given by µ =
α δp0 + β
∑n
i=1 δpi . If a firm constructs the empirical measure µ and believes
a forecast of a particular price makes sense, picking either p0, or any pi,
i = 1, .., n, is consistent with the history of the economy as long as the
forecast resembles on average the empirical measure µ. Under such behavior
the empirical measure will never change.2 In this economy we observe a
rational belief equilibrium: (i) the forecast is on average consistent with the
2In fact, assuming an infinite history makes the empirical measure insensitive to any
change in finitely many periods in time. With finitely many data, the empirical measure
may be more or less sensitive to changes depending on the number of observations.
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empirical measure, and (ii) the production decision based on this forecast
implies the empirical measure on actual market-clearing prices.
Can one defend this concept of rationality against the criticism of neglect
of “obvious” forecasting errors? Would not any firm invest in market analysis
to prevent the forecasting mistake that occurs with frequency 1 − α? Con-
sider a firm with a lifespan shorter than n periods (or which keeps records of
forecasts for a time horizon not exceeding n). The firm will never observe the
cycle because it does not have sufficient data to obtain the systematic mis-
take by comparing its forecast with the subsequently observed price over its
lifetime. More generally one can state that avoiding forecast errors requires
the firm to have sufficient knowledge on the structure of the economy. While
this is possible in the simple model discussed here—provided the history
of forecasts is known—, more elaborate models with several interdependent
markets and exogenous shocks may render this task impossible even under
complete information about own past forecasts.
Short lifetime of agents relative to the history of an economy is common
to many rational belief models (Kurz, 1997), typically formulated as over-
lapping generations models. In the Cobweb model as well in this class of
models the technical tool to implement a forecasting mechanism that gen-
erates a prescribed empirical measure is assessment variables. Let yt be a
stochastic process with values in {p0, p1, ..., pn} such that (almost surely)
limT→∞ 1/T
∑T
t=0 δyt = µ, µ the empirical measure of the Cobweb model
introduced above. yt is the assessment variable of the firm when making
a forecast. Under rational beliefs only the empirical measure of yt is pre-
scribed while all other statistical properties are not restricted. Depending on
the sample paths of the process yt the price may exhibit, for instance, cyclic
behavior, occasional switches between regimes of fixed or varying prices as
well as non-stationary fluctuations. Each price dynamics that can be derived
from an assessment variable yt with empirical measure µ constitutes a ratio-
nal belief equilibrium.
4. Conclusion. This note illustrated that permanent price fluctuations of
the “cobweb type” can be reconciled with rational behavior when interpret-
ing the model in the theory of rational beliefs, Kurz (1994). Starting from
the empirically observed phenomenon that agents’ forecasts exhibit a high
degree of diversity even under identical information, the notion of rationality
in this theory requires only compatibility of the forecast with historical data
(in the sense that the empirical measures coincide). The Cobweb cycle dis-
cussed here provides the most simple example of a rational belief equilibrium
that is not a rational expectations equilibrium.
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